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Abstract 
Many firms encourage employees to own company stock through share plans that subsidize 
the price at favorable rates, but even so many employees do not buy shares.  Using a new 
survey of employees in a multinational with a share ownership plan, we find considerable 
variation in joining among observationally equivalent workers and explore the reasons for the 
variation. Participation in the plan is higher the greater the potential pay-off from joining the 
share plan, which indicates that rational economic calculations affect the decision to join. But 
there is also evidence that psychological factors affect the decision to join. Some non-
members say they intend to join in the future, which means they forgo the benefits of 
immediate membership. The proportion of workers who purchase shares varies across 
workplaces beyond what we predict from worker characteristics. This suggests that co-
worker behavior influences decisions. Indeed, workers say that they pay most attention to 
other workers and little attention to company HR management in their decision on joining.   
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Ownership of shares by employees in their own firm has grown substantially in the advanced 
world. In the past two decades it increased in Britain (Pendleton et al., 2009), the United 
States (Kruse et al., 2008), and in many EU countries (Pendleton et al., 2005; European 
Federation of Employee Share Ownership, 2009). By 2004, one-fifth of British workplaces 
had share ownership plans covering one-third of private sector employees (Bryson and 
Freeman, 2010). In the United States in 2006 an estimated 18% of workers had shares in their 
own firm, some held through collective employee stock ownership plans, some bought 
through employee stock purchase plans that give employees a discount on shares, and some 
through their 401k retirement savings plan money. In addition to owning shares, 9% of US 
employees had stock options with the firm. Taking account of the overlap, 24% had an 
ownership stake through shares or options (Kruse, Blasi, and Park, 2010, Table 1). 
 Firms introduce share ownership plans in the hope that ownership will align employee 
and employer objectives to increase productivity and profits. Surveys show that many 
employees desire some form of ownership in the firm at which they work, so providing this 
benefit ought to increase their loyalty and willingness to work hard for the firm. When firms 
subsidize the purchase of shares through a share ownership plan, the financial deal is often so 
good that nearly all workers should join. But substantial numbers of eligible employees do 
not join share plans in the firms that offer them.  
 What motivates the decision to invest in a subsidized share plan? Opportunity to make 
money? The marketing of the plan? Knowledge of how the plan works? Do employees make 
their decision individually or are they influenced by the behaviour of others in their work 
group?  
 To see what affects the decision to join a share ownership plan, in 2007-2008 we 
surveyed 3,360 employees of a multi-national firm ShareCo that offers a similar plan to 
employees around the world. We asked employees about their knowledge of the share plan 
(‘the Plan’) and the reasons they had or had not joined it.1  The firm distributed the survey 
through the internet to employees in Australia and New Zealand, South Africa, the UK and 
Ireland and the United States.2 The response rates for the survey were 65% in the UK and 
Ireland, 62% in Australia and South Africa but just 35% in the USA. The data covers 19 
business divisions and 39 office locations. Dividing workers into groups based on the 
intersection of division and location to obtain a closer fix on likely “work groups” where 
employees may interact regularly, we obtain 81 work units with one or more person. 
 For most employees the Plan ought to be financially attractive. We illustrate this with 
details of the Plan in Australia. In Australia all permanent employees resident for tax 
purposes could choose between the Exempt Plan, which seemed most suitable for lower paid 
employees and the Deferred Plan, which seemed more suitable for high paid employees. The 
Exempt Plan allowed employees to contribute up to AU$500 per annum in before-tax salary 
to acquire shares, which ShareCo matched up to a maximum of AU$500 per annum. The 
shares were free from taxation on acquisition up to AU$1,000. An employee who held the 
shares for at least three years could sell or transfer them tax free. Thus a worker who bought 
AU$500 shares and held them for 3 years would double their money if the share price held 
steady. The price would have to drop by half before the employee would lose money. The 
Deferred Plan allowed employees to contribute between AU$1,500 and half of their before-
tax annual salary to acquire shares. ShareCo matched contributions up to AU$3,000 per 
annum. The government deferred income tax on share acquisition and did not tax employee 
                                                            
1 The 3,360 employees who responded to the survey included 2,707 with no missing data. 
2 Because the Plan differs modestly across countries we used variants of the survey instrument in each country 
but the differences were so slight that we pool the country responses into a single firm data set.  
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bought shares on sale/transfer for one year and did not tax shares given to employees by 
ShareCo matching their purchases for two years. A worker who bought AU$3,000 and held 
them for two years would double their money if the share price held steady and again break 
even if the price fell to one half its purchase price 
 The pecuniary incentive to join the Plan differs in the other countries where ShareCo 
operates because the firm offers different matching rates to workers and because each country 
gives different tax advantages for ownership. In the UK the company matches shares 
purchased by the employee one for one up to a limit. The scheme qualifies for tax advantages 
as a Share Incentive Plan (SIP), whose tax advantages are comparable to those in the 
Australian tax code.3 In South Africa the matching scheme resembles the Australian Deferred 
plan and thus seems more suited to higher wage workers. Employee contributions come from 
after-tax income and the employer match is subject to income taxation (which the company 
pays) while the gains from sale are subject to capital gains tax.4 All of which makes the 
scheme less valuable to workers than the Australian and UK schemes. In the US the company 
has the smallest matching incentive – a 15% discount on the market price of every purchase 
up to a maximum of US$1,990, which is considerably below the 50% subsidy implicit in the 
matching schemes. A share price fall of 15% or more means that US members of the plan lose 
money.5    
 Table 1 shows the rate of joining the Plan by country, demographic characteristics of 
the worker, attitudes toward risk and sociability, and by job characteristics of workers. Fifty-
six percent of all surveyed employees join the firm’s plan, with considerable variation by 
country and employee characteristics. Australian and UK employees have higher membership 
rates than US employees while the lowest membership rate is in South Africa. Joining varies 
substantially by demographic and job related characteristics but a substantial number of 
employees do not join the Plan even in the groups with the highest participation rates. 
Consider for example rates of joining by age. Older workers are more likely to be members 
than younger workers. However, apart from the small number of workers aged under-25 
years who have very low rates of participation, participation rates vary only modestly by age, 
peaking at 64% for 45-54 year olds. Among occupations, there are also large differences in 
the rates of joining but the 82% rate for the highest group, senior managers, is still far from 
universal joining.  
It is possible that some combination of personal and job characteristics explains much 
of the variation among individuals in joining. To examine this possibility we estimated the 
                                                            
3 Under the UK SIP scheme employees can contribute a minimum of £10 each month up to a maximum amount 
of £125 or 10 per cent of their monthly pre-tax earnings; whichever is the lower amount. This sum is tax-
exempt. ShareCo matches each share purchased up to a value of £125 per month. All shares acquired by the 
employee are exempt from tax if held for five years. 
4 The South African deferred Plan allows permanent employees to contribute at least Rand 1,800 per annum up 
to 50 percent of their after-tax salary to acquire shares under the Plan.  The company matches each Rand 
contributed by the employee up to a maximum of Rand 24,000 per annum to purchase matched shares. The 
shares purchased by the employee vest after the first year and the matching shares from the company vest after 
the second year. Monthly contributions are deducted directly from the employee’s after-tax monthly salary and 
thus are not tax privileged as the shares are acquired with after tax money at their full market value. Matching 
shares are subject to taxation which the employer pays upfront, so that the employee is not liable for income tax. 
However, when employees sell their shares they are subject to capital gains tax. A second share plan awarded 
employees 50 shares free of charge in 2005. 
5 The US plan was open to all full-time employees who work at least 20 hours per week and more than five 
months in a calendar year. Employees may contribute between $10 and $800 per month of their gross salary 
through a payroll deduction. 
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effect of employees’ personal and job characteristics on the probability that the employees 
joined the Plan using probit regressions that link joining the Plan to the demographic and job 
characteristics shown in Table 1. The demographic characteristics are measured by dummy 
variables for age (5 dummy variables); male; black; household status (3 dummies for marital 
and child status); degree holder; holds a professional qualification. In addition, we have two 
measures of the people’s personality, their risk preferences and sociability (to be described 
shortly). We measure job characteristics by occupation (7 dummies); supervisory 
responsibility; contractual hours (4 dummies); months’ tenure with the employer and its 
squared term; payment method (3 dummies); whether working in a company previously 
acquired by ShareCo; and by measures relating to the degree of job autonomy and the ease 
with which one can monitor co-workers’ efforts. There are also dummy variables for the four 
countries surveyed. 
Column 1 of Table 2 presents the probit coefficients and the t-statistics for their 
impact; while column 2 transforms the coefficients into their marginal effects on the 
probability of joining the Plan. Mirroring the means in Table 1, the probability of Plan 
membership rises with age until employees reach their mid-50s and then falls. Compared to 
an employee aged under-25, a ‘like’ employee who is aged 45-54 years has a 15 percentage 
point greater probability of being a Plan member. Interpreted as reflecting age, this suggests 
that many non-members will join the plan in the future as they age. But it is also possible that 
the coefficient reflects cohort differences, in which case joining need not rise as persons age. 
The probability of being a member is also significantly higher for men, for those with degree-
level educational qualifications, and for married persons with children. The gender, degree 
and marital status effects are of a similar size, raising the probability of membership by 
around 6-8 percentage points.6 Together, demographic characteristics account for 7 percent of 
the variance in Plan participation. 
The estimated coefficients and marginal effects of occupation and position in the firm 
in Table 2 show that these factors are more important in determining membership than the 
demographic factors.7 Salaried staff were more likely to join the plan than hourly paid 
workers while those paid salaries plus bonuses were the most likely to join. Being a Senior 
Manager raised the probability of plan membership by 17 percentage points compared to a 
member of the Operations and Delivery Staff (eg. in customer service or a communication 
centre worker). Supervisory status was also positively associated with Plan membership. But 
plan membership probabilities are not a simple reflection of occupational hierarchy: sales 
staff had similar Plan membership probabilities to those in Middle and Lower Management.  
The probability of Plan membership is strongly associated with tenure but the relation 
is not a simple linear one; tenure squared has a negative coefficient in the probit analysis. 
Membership rises with tenure until a worker has 20 years of tenure and then falls. This 
pattern mirrors the pattern of membership in the age dummy variables. Lower membership in 
the Plan with age and tenure could reflect the desire of older and more senior workers to 
diversify their assets as they near retirement but it could also reflect the fact that some of 
those workers joined the firm before the Plan ever came into being and never changed their 
status quo position. 
                                                            
6 There are notable differences in the association between Plan membership and demographic characteristics 
across the four countries surveyed. For example, the possession of professional qualifications is associated with 
a lower probability of Plan membership in the UK and South Africa but not in the USA or Australia. 
7 Taken together job characteristics accounted for 13% of the variance in Plan membership in ShareCo and 10% 
of the variance in contributions among members when entered into the model alone. 
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 To drill deeper into personal factors that might be associated with joining the Plan, we 
asked workers about their attitude toward risk and their propensity to join organizations – 
what may be called sociability.  For risk we asked a question that Dohmen et al.(2005) have 
shown correlates with risk behavior in laboratory experiments. The question is: “are you 
generally a person who is fully prepared to take risks or do you try to avoid taking risks?”  
The responses are scaled from 1 (“Unwilling to take risks”) to 10 (“Fully prepared to take 
risks”). The probit estimates in Column 1 show that risk preferences are not significantly 
related to the person joining the Plan. For ‘sociability’, we asked: “Do you take part in the 
following activities, either as part of your job or outside work? Please select as many as apply 
to you....Belong to a trade/professional body or association; working with schools, colleges, 
universities; being involved in charities or voluntary bodies; being a member of a social, 
sports or arts club; being an active member of a political party; being an active member of a 
religious group; socialising with co-workers outside of work; none of these.”  We counted the 
number of activities employees engaged in and entered it into the probit equation. This 
variable is not associated with membership.  
 We also examined whether employees who felt that they had control of their work 
were more likely to join than those who worked under close supervision. We developed a 
scale based on the question: “Are you closely supervised, or do you work fairly 
independently of close supervision?”  We coded responses from 1 representing “working 
independently of close supervision” to 10 “closely supervised”. There is a strong negative 
correlation between close supervision and the propensity to participate in the Plan. An 
increase of 1 point on the close supervision scale reduces Plan participation by two 
percentage points, other things equal.  
 The last factor that substantially influences employee decisions to join the plan is the 
location of workers. Addition of the country dummies raises the proportion of the variance in 
Plan participation accounted for by the model from 15 per cent to 20 per cent. The differences 
among countries shown in the Table 1 are barely affected by the covariates in the multivariate 
analysis. To illustrate the magnitude of the country effect, consider the difference in outcomes 
among observationally equivalent employees in different countries. As a base case we take a 
45-54 year old married man with children, with a degree, in senior management, with 
supervisory responsibilities, with a contract for 40 or more hours per week, with 10 years 
tenure, paid a salary with bonus, who is not closely supervised and has sample mean 
characteristics on all other variables in the model. The model in Table 2 gives this ‘base case’ 
person an estimated probability of Plan membership in Australia of 90 per cent, of 
membership in the UK, of 84 per cent, in the US, of 70 percent probability and in South 
Africa of 69 per cent probability.  
Column 3 of Table 2 uses linear regression to assess the determinants of the monthly 
contributions of workers to the Plan among those who made contributions. For simplicity we 
transformed all of the contributions data into US dollars at the then prevailing exchange rate. 
These estimates show that most of attributes of persons and jobs associated with a greater 
probability of being a plan member are also associated with greater contributions conditional 
on being a member. Again, more of the variation in amounts contributed is attributable to 
differences in job-related characteristics than in demographic or personal characteristics. 
In sum, the key finding in Table 2 is that job characteristics and the location of the job 
are more important in determining membership in the Plan than the demographic 
characteristics of workers or our measures of risk preferences or sociability. It is more what 
you do and where you do it than who you are.  
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Homo Economicus and Homo Behavioricus Explanations 
 
The economist's model of Homo Economicus directs attention at pecuniary factors as likely 
determinants of joining the Plan. Homo Economicus presumably assesses the size of the 
subsidy and tax breaks, the time required to hold the stock before those benefits kick in, and 
the likely trend and variability in the share price in deciding whether to join a share plan. At a 
big enough subsidy/tax break and expectation of staying with the firm long enough to gain 
the advantages, this model suggests that almost everyone would buy the shares. But with a 
modest subsidy/tax break and a short time horizon of staying with the firm, it predicts that 
many workers would reject holding assets in company stock.8 As noted, the cross country 
differences in joining are consistent with differences in the company subsidy to purchase 
shares and the tax break for owning shares. But there are other reasons why pecuniary 
considerations might lead someone to take their money in cash rather than to invest in the 
Plan. A persons paying high interest on credit card or other debt has a pecuniary incentive to  
pay the debt rather than to invest in the firm. The Economicus model also allows for non-
pecuniary factors associated with the person's preferences toward risk to affect the decision to 
join a share plan. Someone who finds it painful to see the share price fluctuate significantly 
over time and who gains little additional utility from increases in the price ought to keep their 
money in some safer asset. Our measure of risk-aversion did not help explain decisions but 
perhaps a measure of loss aversion would help explain some of those who turn down the 
seemingly profitable investment opportunity. 
  The psychology model of Homo Behavioricus directs attention at the imperfect way 
people actually make decisions. One factor that has received attention in analysis of 
responses to seemingly fruitful decisions is procrastination, a delay in changing a default 
position even when it is advantageous to make one's choice quickly, that imply large internal 
transaction costs (Madrian and Shea, 2000; Engelhardt and Madrian, 2004). Another  
Behavioricus factor that has also received attention in decisions are peer effects, where 
someone's decision depends critically on the decisions of others with whom they associate. 
To be sure, there can be rational  reasons for peer effects – the wisdom of the crowd that often 
gives a better assessment of reality than individual judgment. But the traditional  Economicus  
model does not treat them as a major factor in decision-making. 
  Finally, both models recognize that imperfect information can prevent an individual 
from rationally assessing the costs and benefits of investments. If you are uncertain of the 
consequences of an action, don't act. The Economicus model treats lack of information as 
reflecting the costs of obtaining it. Given company efforts to inform employees about the 
plan, it seems implausible that costs of information deter employees from learning the facts. 
The Behavioricus model raises the possibility that employees may tune out firm-provided 
information as just another bit of firm propaganda or sales pitch and procrastinate in 
addressing that information, though one could also easily see this as rational behavior.  
 To find out the pecuniary factors and behavioral factors stressed by these two   models 
that may underlie employee decisions on joining ShareCo's share plan we asked employees 
why they did or did not participate in the plan. Then we examine the pattern of membership 
across business units and locales for evidence on one of the main factors they identified as 
important in decisions: discussions with co-workers.  
                                                            
8 These are frequently cited as the reasons why employees often choose not to claim in-work benefits and tax 
credits (see, for example, Bingley and Walker, 2001). 
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What Workers Say 
 
Economists are often leery of what people say about their decisions on surveys, but it is 
usually better to obtain such information when possible than to speculate about why persons 
behaved in particular ways without any indication of what they believe affected their 
decision.  
 We asked workers who had joined the Plan: “what made you join the Plan?” and 
asked those who did not join: “Why have you never joined the Plan?”  We allowed them to 
give more than one reason. Table 3 displays the percentage of responses given to each of the 
questions (which sum to 100%) and the percentage of respondents who gave the answers 
(which can sum to over 100% because respondents could give multiple answers). 
 The responses in Panel A show that the employees who joined the Plan deliberated 
over the decision. Just 10% of responses and 13% of respondents gave the response that the 
employee had joined automatically without thinking much about it. The most common reason 
for joining was that it had been a “good investment” given by 73% of Plan members. Country 
data (not shown in the table) reveal that the percentage motivated by good investment varied 
by country. Eighty-seven percent of UK Plan members cited ‘good investment’ as the reason 
for joining whereas 73% of US Plan members cited good investment. This presumably 
reflects the fact that joining the Plan was a better investment in the UK than in the US 
because the company sharing rate was much lower in the US. In the total sample 39% of 
respondents reported that their joining was because they felt good about the company, which 
implies that the decision was influenced by factors beyond the expectation of future financial 
rewards. Those in the US (again data not given in the table) were significantly more likely to 
cite feeling good about the company as a reason for joining: one half did so compared to 
around one-third in the other three countries. 
 The responses in Panel B show that the employees who did not join also paid attention 
to perceived pecuniary returns. Thirty-seven percent of non-members said their contribution 
would take too much out of their salary.9  Six per cent of respondents thought it made sense to 
invest outside the firm in which they worked. Approximately twice as many non-joiners gave 
that answer in the United States, where many employees invest substantial sums in their own 
businesses through 401k retirement plans. Nine percent of non-members didn't want the risk 
of investing in shares per se. 
 One-quarter of employees said they were ‘about to join’ the plan, which fits with the 
behavioral proposition that individuals often procrastinate in making a decision  beneficial to 
them (Rabin, 1998). These non-members had lower tenure than other non-members – 28 per 
cent had been with the company for six months or less compared to 18 per cent of other non-
members – suggesting that they had insufficient time to make their decision since joining the 
company.  Seven per cent of non-members said they chose not to join because they “Don’t 
intend to be with the company very long”. Almost two-thirds of these non-members expected 
to be working at ShareCo for under a year, compared with 7 per cent of other non-members, 
which means they would gain less from the investment. Finally, 3 per cent of non-members 
cited features of the Plan they did not like as a reason to avoid investing in it. A larger 
proportion (14 per cent) said that one reason for not joining the Plan was that they did not 
understand it. Of the 20 percent who gave “other reasons” 8 per cent said they had never 
heard of the plan.  
                                                            
9 Financial constraints and opportunities dominated other aspects of Plan investment too: the need for money 
was the chief reason given for selling shares and the availability of more money was given as the primary reason 
for increasing monthly contributions. The need for money was also the chief reason for leaving the Plan, though 
very few employees had actually left (4% of all employees and 6% of those who had ever been a member). 
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 In a separate question we also asked employees how well they understood aspects of 
the Plan. Consistent with the notion the insufficient information may have deterred some 
from joining, twenty-seven cent of non-members answered ‘not very well’ or ‘not at all well’ 
while just 4 per cent of those who had joined the plan gave those answers to the information 
question.  
 
 
The Role of Co-Workers 
 
We used data on the office locations and business units of the firm to estimate the proportion 
of employee respondents who worked in the same office and business unit. This enables us to 
estimate whether membership is more concentrated among employees likely to interact with 
each other than would happen if each employee decided to join independently of those of 
others in their location/unit. Greater concentration of membership than expected by 
independent choice would indicate that decisions were potentially subject to the influence of 
co-workers through some form of peer effects. 
 To determine the expected level of Plan membership at the different locations, we 
used our Table 2 probit model to predict the determinants of the probability an individual 
employee would join the plan. Then we averaged the probabilities for the employees at each 
location to get the expected level of joining in the location. Since the probabilities for 
individuals come from the same model, the predicted levels of joining vary across locations 
because of differences in the observable characteristics of workers across the locations. In 
offices with senior upper level managers, for instance, our model predicts higher membership 
than in workplaces with many less highly paid and skilled workers.  
 Graph 1 is a scatter graph that plots the actual mean membership against the predicted 
rate of joining the Plan for each of the 88 location/business unit categories for which we have 
data on more than a single person. The predicted and actual distributions are positively 
correlated at 0.60.   
 If the decisions of workers at a particular office-business unit are influenced by the 
decisions of others the dispersion of the rate of actual membership should be greater than the 
dispersion of the predicted rates, since the latter are based on a model that did not allow for 
peer or contagion type effects. Most models of peer or contagion effects predict greater 
dispersion in measures of behavior across groups than would occur based on the demographic 
characteristics of people because interactions in the group produce similar behavior (Glaeser, 
Sacerdote, Scheinkman, 2006).  The models allow the interactions to produce both more and 
less of the behavior. To see if this was true in our data, we calculated the dispersion of actual 
and predicted membership in the Plan across the sites. In fact the standard deviation of the 
distribution of actual rates of joining across the 88 location/business units was 0.24 compared 
to a standard deviation of just 0.17 for the predicted rates across the same location/business 
units. A variance ratio test for the equality of standard deviations confirms that the 
distributions are significantly different from one another.10 
 There is, however, a difficulty with this analysis. Some of our location/business units 
have many employees and survey respondents while others have few employees and survey 
respondents. The range of responses was from 383 in the largest unit to less than five in 30 
units. Consistent with a peer effect or contagion model, much of the greater variation in 
actual rates occurs in workplaces with few workers. 11  But such a pattern could arise for 
                                                            
10 This F-test for the homogeneity of variances is performed using STATA’s sdtest. F2.83, df 117, F>f 0.0000. 
11 Thus, among all 118 office-business units the standard deviation for membership was 0.32 compared to 0.19 
for the predicted rates across the same location/business units. 
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reasons of sampling variability as well as for interactions. The smaller the number of 
observations the more dispersed will any distribution be around its mean. One way of dealing 
with this problem is to compute the standard deviations from variances weighted by the 
number of persons in the location/business unit. Weighted by the number of persons in each 
office, the standard deviation for the actual distribution is 0.19 while the standard deviation 
for the predicted distribution is 0.15 – a smaller but still noticeable difference.12 
 The standard deviation is, however, a crude measure of the way peer effects or 
interactions would produce a different shape of the distribution of actual outcomes than the  
distribution that would result absent peer effects. Graph 2 displays the histogram for the 
distribution of observed rates of joining the Plan among locations/business units, weighted by 
the number of employees and the histogram for the rates predicted by our model and the 
demographic distribution of the workplaces. The continuous curve shows the normal curve 
fit. It shows a more bifurcated distribution for the actual (left-hand panel) than for the 
predicted (right-hand panel) rates, which is what one would expect if peer effects induce 
more workers to join at some sites and fewer workers to join at others than would happen 
from choices that were not influenced by fellow workers. 
 As a final test of the relation between location/business unit and joining the Plan, we  
added dummy variables for business unit/location to our Table 2 probit analysis. The addition 
of dummies raises the pseudo-R square that summarizes the fit of the model from 0.19 to 
0.22, which is significant by a chi-square test. Thus, we are better able to predict which 
workers join the plan and which do not upon addition of the information on business 
unit/location data. Note, however, that this tells us only that units/locations differ in rates of 
joining from what one would expect on the basis of the characteristics of employees. It does 
not tell us at which locations the peer effects are likely to produce higher or lower rates of 
joining. Nor does it tell us whether in fact the observed patterns are truly attributable to the 
influence of co-workers on decisions or some other aspect of the workplace.  
 To get more direct evidence on whether co-workers influence persons to join the Plan 
compared we asked employees about the influence of fellow workers, management and other 
persons on their decision regarding the plan. We asked: “Have you/did you ever talk to any of 
the following people about membership of the Plan?...Fellow workers; My Supervisor; HR 
Manager/Department; Family or Friends Outside the Company; A Financial or Legal Adviser 
Outside the Company”. If they answered yes, we asked if the people were important in the 
decision that the worker made. 
Table 4 summarizes responses to these questions,  Fifty-two percent of employees 
cited none of the five sources of information as important, but members reported speaking to 
more people than non-members and ascribed more importance to those discussions in their 
membership decision than did non-members. Employees were most likely to discuss Plan 
membership with fellow employees – 59 percent had done so – than with anyone else. In 
addition, more employees viewed these discussions as important in deciding whether or not 
to join than discussions with anyone else. By contrast, only 14 per cent reported that they had 
discussed membership with HR staff and only 7 per cent viewed discussions with HR staff as 
important. The influence at the workplace that leads some locations to join the Plan more 
than others thus appears to rest with co-workers rather than with management.  
As a further test of the potential influence of co-workers on decisions, we introduced a 
set of dummy variables for whether an employee had talked to a particular group about Plan 
membership into the Table 2 model of individual decision regarding the Plan. Table 5 gives 
the estimated coefficients on these variables from the new estimated model. The estimates 
                                                            
12 A chi-squared test of variance confirms this difference is statistically significant. 
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show that talking to fellow employees was associated with an 8 percentage point increase in 
joining the plan while talking to supervisors was associated with a 6 percentage point 
increase. But it also shows that talking to family and friends increased the probability of Plan 
membership by 13 percentage points relative to not talking to them. Since proportionately 
fewer workers said they had talked with family members than said they had talked with 
fellow employees, the larger coefficient on talking with family members does not mean that 
the family was more important than the workplace. The two routes of impact add roughly 
similar explanatory power in the augmented regression model. 13 
 Finally, we asked employees another question that casts light on potential peer 
influences in decisions to join the Plan. This question related to workers perceptions’ of 
whether other workers are joining the plan: “What percentage of workers in your business 
unit do you think are members of the Plan?”  If workers are following some perceived norm 
at their workplace we would expect those who believe many others are members would also 
join. In fact, the probability of an individual being a Plan member rises steeply with the 
perception of the Plan membership rate among co-workers.14 The correlation coefficient for 
the employees’ perception of the Plan participation rate in the business unit and the actual 
Plan membership rate in business units as derived in our data was 0.23, which shows that the 
measure of perception does not simply reflect the actual rate of membership, which makes it 
hard to interpret in any causal manner (Manski, 1993).   
 Taken together the evidence on the concentration of membership by office, employees  
reporting that co-workers were important sources of information, and on their perceptions of 
the participation of other workers on their joining the Plan directs attention at peer influences 
on joining decisions above and beyond those that influence individual decisions in isolation. 
 
 
Conclusion  
 
Many firms encourage employees to own company stock through share plans that subsidize 
the price at favorable rates, which should make the decision to participate in the plan a “no 
brainer”. Even so, many employees do not buy shares. Our analysis of a survey of employees 
in a multinational with a share ownership plan finds considerable variation in joining for 
observationally equivalent workers within the firm. Workers’ probability of joining the share 
Plan are higher the greater the potential pay-off, pointing to an important role for rational 
economic calculations. But some non-members say they intend to join in the future, which 
forgoes the benefits of immediate membership.  And the behavior of co-workers influences 
the purchase of shares while company HR information does not affect the decision.  The 
evidence thus indicates that participation reflects a mixture of economic responses to 
incentives and behavioral economics responses to what others do. 
                                                            
13 The only communication channel associated with a significant increase in monthly investments was talking to 
family and friends, perhaps reflecting discussions regarding the ability of the family to find the money to invest 
in the Plan. We also found that the HR effect differed in country-level regressions. It was large and positive for 
South Africa but negative effect in the USA. 
14 Adding this perception measure to the Table 2 regression model, the effect of perceived membership among 
co-workers being around half (40-59%) raised the probability of an individual’s membership by 35 percentage 
points relative to a case in which the employee believed no co-workers were members.  
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Table 1: Rates of Joining Share Plan by Demographic and Personal Factors and by Job-
Related Factors 
 Mean membership Monthly contributions (US$), 
members only 
Whole sample 56 153 
Country: 
  UK 
  USA 
  South Africa 
  Australia 
 
56 
45 
34 
75 
 
152 
155 
71 
169 
Demographic Factors: 
Age (years): 
 <25 
 25-34 
 35-44 
 45-54 
 55+ 
 
28 
56 
63 
64 
58 
 
101 
134 
179 
161 
159 
Sex: 
 Male 
 Female 
 
61 
51 
 
179 
121 
Ethnicity: 
 Black 
 Not black 
 
32 
60 
 
64 
160 
Qualifications: 
 Degree 
 No degree 
 
63 
51 
 
182 
130 
Professional Qualifications: 
 Yes 
 No 
 
58 
56 
 
180 
147 
Household circumstances: 
 Not married/living as married 
 Married, no children living at home 
 Married, children living at home 
 
47 
62 
62 
 
136 
150 
174 
Personal factors:  
Risk scale (1,10): 
 1 
 5 
 10 
 
54 
55 
43 
 
96 
137 
195 
Sociability scale (0 to 7): 
 0 
 3 
 7 
 
51 
57 
50 
 
131 
183 
257 
Job-related factors: 
Occupation: 
 Senior Manager 
 Middle manager 
 Lower manager 
 Operational/delivery 
 Support 
 Technical 
 Sales 
 
82 
65 
47 
46 
58 
72 
77 
 
254 
187 
129 
106 
137 
191 
181 
Payment method: 
 Hourly 
 Salary only 
 Salary plus bonus/commission 
 
35 
57 
78 
 
99 
147 
210 
Supervisory responsibilities: 
 Yes 
 No 
 
68 
50 
 
183 
132 
Contracted weekly hours of work:   
13 
 <35 
 35 
 >35<40 
 40+ 
56 
56 
59 
53 
127 
149 
160 
155 
Company tenure >=4 years: 
 Yes 
 No 
 
68 
44 
 
156 
147 
Close supervision scale (1,10): 
 1 
 5 
 10 
 
65 
50 
28 
 
168 
130 
93 
How easy to monitor others scale (1,10): 
 1 
 5 
 10 
 
48 
54 
49 
 
106 
148 
157 
% family income from ShareCo earnings: 
 <80% 
 80%+ 
 
55 
57 
 
151 
156 
Worked for company acquired by ShareCo: 
 Yes 
 No 
 
60 
54 
 
158 
149 
 
Note: N varies from 2725 to 2783. Contributions are converted to $US using exchange rates at the time of the 
survey. Monthly contributions are the mid-point in banded data.  
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Table 2: Estimates of the effect of Characteristics, Risk Aversion, and Sociability on 
Plan Membership and Monthly Contributions ($US) 
 (1a) Membership 
probit 
(2) Membership 
marginal effects 
(3) Monthly 
contributions 
(only for those 
who contribute) 
Age (ref.: <25 years)    
25-34 years 0.209** 0.081** 12.302 
 (2.193) (2.211) (1.119) 
35-44 years 0.243** 0.094** 44.908*** 
 (2.212) (2.253) (3.428) 
45-54 years 0.387*** 0.146*** 52.846*** 
 (3.307) (3.474) (3.849) 
55+ years 0.313** 0.118** 63.535*** 
 (2.229) (2.343) (3.971) 
Male 0.151*** 0.059*** 27.315*** 
 (2.642) (2.647) (4.304) 
Black -0.043 -0.017 -39.309*** 
 (-0.419) (-0.417) (-3.068) 
Degree 0.206*** 0.080*** 12.867* 
 (3.167) (3.192) (1.797) 
Professional qualification -0.087 -0.034 1.852 
 (-1.182) (-1.177) (0.170) 
Household status (ref.: not married/living as married)   
Married/living as married, no children at 
home 
 
0.039 
 
0.015 -4.515 
 (0.567) (0.569) (-0.578) 
Married/living as married, children at 
home 
0.147** 0.057** 
11.278 
 (2.112) (2.129) (1.276) 
Sociability scale 0.003 0.001 6.637* 
 (0.135) (0.135) (1.851) 
Risk scale 0.033 0.013 -12.458* 
 (0.572) (0.572) (-1.719) 
Risk scale squared -0.004 -0.001 1.319** 
 (-0.770) (-0.770) (2.124) 
Occupation (ref.: operational/delivery)    
Senior manager 0.414** 0.153*** 62.596*** 
 (2.487) (2.709) (3.285) 
Middle manager 0.315** 0.119*** 28.400* 
 (2.526) (2.648) (1.744) 
Lower manager 0.229** 0.089** 2.254 
 (2.068) (2.110) (0.157) 
Support 0.128 0.05 22.137** 
 (1.440) (1.458) (2.431) 
Technical 0.199* 0.077** 42.163*** 
15 
 (1.922) (1.968) (3.806) 
Sales 0.284* 0.108** 31.746** 
 (1.933) (2.027) (2.310) 
Supervisory responsibilities 0.122* 0.048* 16.844* 
 (1.821) (1.831) (1.868) 
Contractual weekly hours (ref.: 40+ hours)    
<35 hours -0.149 -0.059 -13.387 
 (-1.320) (-1.312) (-1.159) 
35 hours -0.101 -0.040 -3.907 
 (-0.904) (-0.900) (-0.379) 
>35 hours<40 hours -0.228*** -0.090*** -2.342 
 (-2.909) (-2.902) (-0.300) 
Tenure (months with company) 0.013*** 0.005*** -0.09 
 (10.715) (10.730) (-0.603) 
Tenure squared -0.000*** -0.000*** 0.000 
 (-8.093) (-8.094) (0.037) 
Payment method (ref.: Salary only)    
Hourly -0.240*** -0.095*** -21.847** 
 (-3.076) (-3.064) (-2.280) 
Salary plus bonus/commission 0.288*** 0.110*** 21.98* 
 (2.932) (3.049) (1.793) 
Close supervision scale -0.046*** -0.018*** -0.311 
 (-4.493) (-4.491) (-0.211) 
How easy to monitor others’ efforts scale -0.009 -0.004 1.815 
 (-0.804) (-0.804) (1.289) 
Worked in company acquired by ShareCo -0.015 -0.006 6.368 
 (-0.231) (-0.231) (0.799) 
Country (ref.: UK)    
USA -0.574*** -0.226*** -23.062 
 (-4.152) (-4.242) (-1.246) 
South Africa -0.504*** -0.199*** -69.953*** 
 (-4.005) (-4.085) (-5.255) 
Australia 0.640*** 0.240*** -0.685 
 (7.085) (7.616) (-0.082) 
Constant -0.672***  83.529 
 (-2.928)  (2.997) 
r2  0.20 0.20 p>chi2=0.0000 
N 2706 2706 1506 
 
Notes:  (1) Model 1 is a probit for membership. The marginal effects are in 1(b). Model 2 uses interval 
regression for contributions per month for current members where the dependent variable is banded 
contributions data converted into US$ using exchange rates at the time of the survey. The interval regression 
lnsigma 4.83 t=82.66. Model based on 0 left-censored observations 284 uncensored observations 39 right-
censored observations and 1183 interval observations. (2) Robust estimator used. (3) T-statistics are presented in 
parentheses. *=significant at 10% level, **=significant at 95% confidence interval; ***=significant at 99% 
confidence interval.  
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Table 3: Reasons for Joining and Not Joining the Plan 
 
Panel A: Reason for Joining % of responses % of joiners (can 
answer more than 
one category) 
Good investment 56 73 
Joined automatically without thinking 
much about it 
10 13 
Felt good about the company 30 39 
Other reasons 5 7 
 
Note: Unweighted N=1,776 employees and 2,320 responses. 
 
 
Panel B: Reason for Not joining %  of 
responses 
% of nonjoiners (can 
answer more than one 
category) 
Would take too much out of my salary/can’t 
afford it 
31 37 
Financial sense to invest outside the firm 
where you work 
5 6 
Don’t want risk of investing in shares 7 9 
Don’t intend to be with the company very 
long 
6 7 
I am about to join/will join shortly 20 25 
Features of the Plan I don’t like 3 3 
I don’t really understand the Plan 12 14 
Other reasons 16 20 
 
Note: Unweighted N=1,076 employees and 1,300 responses. 
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Table 4: Importance of Discussions with Others in Membership Decision 
 Non-member Member All 
Fellow workers 
 Yes, important 
 Yes, not important 
 No 
 
23 
26 
51 
 
38 
28 
34 
 
32 
27 
42 
Supervisor 
 Yes, important 
 Yes, not important 
 No  
 
13 
12 
76 
 
19 
14 
68 
 
16 
13 
71 
HR manager/department 
 Yes, important 
 Yes, not important 
 No 
 
7 
7 
85 
 
7 
6 
87 
 
7 
7 
86 
Family/friends outside the company 
 Yes, important 
 Yes, not important 
 No 
 
17 
30 
70 
 
29 
19 
52 
 
24 
16 
60 
Financial/legal adviser outside the company 
 Yes, important 
 Yes, not important 
 No 
 
6 
5 
89 
 
10 
7 
83 
 
8 
6 
86 
 
Notes: (1) Employees were asked: “Have you/did you ever talk to any of the following people about 
membership of the Plan? If yes were they important in the decision you made?” (2) Table presents column 
percentages. 
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Table 5: Estimates of the Effect of Talking to Other Persons on Whether the Employee 
Joined the Plan 
 
Who talked to about Plan membership: Probit 
coefficients 
Marginal effects 
Fellow workers 0.208*** 0.082 
 (3.30)  
Supervisor 0.152** 0.059 
 (2.20)  
HR manager/department -0.127 -0.050 
 (1.41)  
Family or friends 0.332*** 0.129 
 (5.30)  
Financial or legal adviser 0.042 0.016 
 (0.46)  
 
Notes: (1) T-statistics in parentheses with asterisk signifying significance where *=0.10 **=0.05 ***=0.01. (2) 
Controls are as per Table 2. (3) Predicted membership mean under the model is 0.572. 
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Graph 1: The Percentage of Workers by office who Join the Plan in our Sample 
Compared to the Percentage Predicted by Worker Characteristics at Each Office  
 
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
(m
ea
n)
 p
rm
em
b1
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
(mean) member
 
Note: each dot represents an office/business unit location. Locations with only a single respondent have been 
removed. N=88. Correlation of the actual rate of membership vs predicted rate across offices of 0.60. 
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Graph 2: Mean Membership Per Office/Business Unit and Predicted Mean Membership 
Per Office/Business Unit Weighted by Number of Unit Respondents (continuous line is 
the normal curve fit) 
0
.5
1
1.
5
2
2.
5
D
en
si
ty
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
(mean) member
0
1
2
3
D
en
si
ty
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
(mean) prmemb1
 
CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 
Recent Discussion Papers 
1000 John Van Reenen Title TBC 
999 Leonardo Iacovone 
Ferdinand Rauch 
L. Alan Winters 
Trade as an Engine of Creative Destruction: 
Mexican Experience with Chinese 
Competition 
998 David Marsden The End of National Models in 
Employment Relations? 
997 Ralf Martin Productivity Spreads, Market Power 
Spreads and Trade 
996 Rachel Smithies A Map of Mental Health 
995 Kristian Behrens 
Gregory Corcos 
Giordano Miron 
Trade Crisis? What Trade Crisis? 
994 Stephen Redding Theories of Heterogeneous Firms and 
Trade 
993 Jordi Blanes I Vidal 
Mirko Draca 
Christian Fons Rosen 
Revolving Door Lobbyists 
992 Susan Scott 
John Van Reenen 
Markos Zachariadis 
The Impact of the Diffusion of a Financial 
Innovation on Company Performance: An 
Analysis of SWIFT Adoption 
991 Sergey Lychagin 
Joris Pinkse 
Margaret E. Slade 
John Van Reenen 
Spillovers in Space: Does Geography 
Matter? 
990 Luis Garicano 
Rosa Lastra 
Towards a New Architecture for Financial 
Stability: Seven Principles 
989 David Marsden The Growth of Extended ‘Entry 
Tournaments’ and the Decline of 
Institutionalised Occupational Labour 
Markets in Britain 
988 Zack Cooper 
Stephen Gibbons 
Simon Jones 
Alistair McGuire 
Does Hospital Competition Improve 
Efficiency? An Analysis of the Recent 
Market-Based Reforms to the English NHS 
987 Guy Michaels 
Ashwini Natraj 
John Van Reenen 
Has ICT Polarized Skill Demand? 
Evidence from Eleven Countries Over 25 
Years 
986 J. M. C. Santos Silva 
Silvana Tenreyro 
Currency Unions in Prospect and 
Retrospect 
985 Fabian Waldinger Quality Matters – The Expulsion of 
Professors and Ph.D. Student Outcomes in 
Nazi Germany 
984 Brian Bell 
Stephen Machin 
Francesco Fasani 
Crime and Immigration: Evidence from 
Large Immigrant Waves 
983 Nicholas Bloom 
Carol Propper 
Stephan Seiler 
John Van Reenen 
The Impact of Competition on 
Management Quality: Evidence from 
Public Hospitals 
982 Nicholas Bloom 
John Van Reenen 
Human Resource Management and 
Productivity 
981 Alan Manning Imperfect Competition in the Labour 
Market 
980 Ana Fernandes 
Heiwai Tang 
The Determinants of Vertical Integration in 
Export Processing: Theory and Evidence 
from China 
979 Stephen Machin 
Olivier Marie 
Sunčica Vujić 
The Crime Reducing Effect of Education 
978 Andrew B. Bernard 
J. Bradford Jensen 
Stephen Redding 
Peter K. Schott 
Intra-Firm Trade and Product 
Contractibility (Long Version) 
977 Albrecht Ritschl 
Samad Sarferaz 
Crisis? What Crisis? Currency vs Banking 
in the Financial Crisis of 1931 
976 Joshua D. Angrist 
Jörn-Steffen Pischke 
The Credibility Revolution in Empirical 
Economics: How Better Research Design is 
taking the Con out of Econometrics 
975 Holger Breinlich 
Alejandro Cuñat 
Trade Liberalization and Heterogeneous 
Firm Models: An Evaluation Using the 
Canada – US Free Trade Agreement 
974 Facundo Albornoz 
Hector Calvo-Pardo 
Gregory Corcos 
Emanuel Ornelas 
Sequential Exporting 
 
The Centre for Economic Performance Publications Unit 
Tel 020 7955 7284  Fax 020 7955 7595 
Email info@cep.lse.ac.uk  Web site http://cep.lse.ac.uk  
